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I. Introduction
The doctrines and remedies that make up the common law charities tradition belong to the realm of equity. Inherited from the 
ecclesiastical courts, they were, by the fifteenth century, being applied by 
the Lord Chancellor of England, who granted to charitable gifts the same 
privileges that canon law had anciently awarded to legacies ad pias causas.1 
Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the 
English Court of Chancery developed the law of charities, determining 
the boundaries of the legal concept of charity, confirming its privileges, 
and expanding the tools for its enforcement. By the early nineteenth 
century, when the English law of equity was being introduced into the 
colonies of British North America2, there was in place an extensive set of 
equitable doctrines relating to charitable trusts, charitable corporations 
and charitable gifts. 
Today, in Canada, it is arguable that the most significant heir of 
this equitable jurisdiction is the appellate court of “law, equity, and 
1. Gareth H Jones, History of the Law of Charity, 1532-1827 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969) at 4-9.
2. JE Cote, ‘The Reception of English Law’ (1977) 15 Alberta Law Review 
29 at 57-59.
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admiralty” created by the Federal Courts Act 3 (“FCA”). Pursuant to 
section 172(3) of the Income Tax Act 4 (“ITA”), a decision of the Minister 
of National Revenue to exclude an organization from registered charity 
status is appealed directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. The Federal 
Court of Appeal is therefore the first line judicial arbiter of whether an 
applicant is “constituted and operated exclusively for charitable purposes” 
(constituée ou administrée exclusivement à des fins de bienfaisance), or 
is an “organization…which devotes all of its resources to charitable 
activities” (œuvre…dont la totalité des ressources est consacrée à des activités 
de bienfaisance) so as to qualify it for charitable registration.5 Due to the 
constraints on appealing civil matters to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the Federal Court of Appeal also generally has the last word on whether a 
purpose or activity is “charitable”. For almost twenty years, that last word 
has consistently been “no”.6
It is the Canadian judiciary’s longstanding approach to the 
interpretation of the registered charity provisions that links the Federal 
Court of Appeal to the charity law tradition of the Chancery Courts. 
The ITA does not define the word “charitable” (de bienfaisance). In this 
situation, the Federal Court of Appeal has always relied on the common 
law to give meaning to the statutory term. The Supreme Court of 
Canada confirmed the propriety of this approach in Vancouver Society of 
3. RSC 1970, c 10 [FCA].
4. RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA]. 
5. Ibid s 149.1(1), “charitable foundation” (fondation de bienfaisance); 
“charitable organisation” (oeuvre de bienfaisance). The Department of 
Finance has faced considerable pressure to introduce amendments that 
would allow charity registration and revocation appeals to be taken to 
the Tax Court of Canada. So far, however, the only response has been 
the extension of the internal objection review process of the Minister 
of National Revenue: see William Innes & Patrick J Boyle, Charities, 
Non-Profits and Philanthropy Under the Income Tax Act (Toronto: CCH 
Canadian, 2006) at 13.
6. The last time a charity successfully appealed a charitable registration 
decision was in 1996: see Vancouver Regional FreeNet Assn v Minister of 
National Revenue, [1996] 3 FC 880 (CA) [Vancouver Regional FreeNet]. 
Since 1999, there have been at least 17 unsuccessful appeals by charities to 
the Federal Court of Appeal. 
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Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v Minister of National Revenue7 
(“Vancouver Society”), stating that the ITA:
… appears clearly to envisage a resort to the common law for a definition of 
‘charity’ in its legal sense as well as for the principles that should guide us in 
applying that definition …8 
and that:
 … whether a purpose would or may operate for the public benefit is to be 
answered by the court on the basis of the record before it and in exercise of its 
equitable jurisdiction in matters of charity.9
In the years before and since the Vancouver Society decision, there has been 
extensive debate on the merits of resorting to the common law definition 
of charity for purposes of interpreting federal tax legislation. However, 
considerably less thought has been given to the principles that should 
guide the Federal Court in applying that definition, or to the nature of 
the equitable jurisdiction that a court must exercise in the context of the 
registered charity regime.
This essay explores what, if anything, it means for the Federal Court 
of Appeal to be a “court of equity” in the exercise of its jurisdiction over 
matters related to registered charity status under the ITA. Its premise is 
that the equitable jurisdiction over charities encompasses a number of 
curative principles which traditionally functioned to effectuate indefinite 
or otherwise defective gifts and which might usefully be invoked in an 
appropriate case to lift the law of (registered) charities out of its present 
state of inertia. The essay begins by describing the equitable jurisdiction 
that is conferred on the Federal Court of Appeal by the terms of the 
FCA (Part II). It then identifies several key principles of the equitable 
jurisdiction over charities, and explores what impact those principles 
might have had on recent charitable registration appeals, had they been 
invoked (Part III). Finally, having established how equitable principles 
have traditionally influenced judicial decision-making regarding the 
charitable nature of purposes and activities, the essay turns to examine 
the chief arguments for and against their application by the Federal 
7. [1999] 1 SCR 10 [Vancouver Society]. 
8. Ibid at para 28.
9. Ibid at para 175. 
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Court of Appeal (Part IV). 
II. The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Federal Court 
of Appeal
The Federal Court of Appeal is the successor of the Appeal Division of the 
Federal Court of Canada, which was created in 1971 to be the successor 
to the Exchequer Court of Canada. Like our other federal courts, it is a 
court created by the Parliament of Canada under the authority of section 
101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.10 The jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court of Appeal is often described as “exceptional”.11 In contrast to the 
provincial superior courts, which have a general and inherent jurisdiction, 
it has no jurisdiction except that conferred by statute.12 In a famous series 
of cases dating from 1976, the Supreme Court of Canada also limited 
the exercise of Canadian federal court jurisdiction to substantive federal 
law, holding that there must be an “existing body of federal law which is 
essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory 
grant of jurisdiction”.13 However, the general trend that has characterized 
recent federal court jurisprudence is the adoption of an increasingly 
expansive approach to federal court jurisdiction.14 It is uncontroversial 
that the federal courts may decide incidental questions of provincial law 
10. (UK) 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
11. Brian J Saunders, Justice Donald J Rennie & Graham Garton QC, Federal 
Courts Practice 2015 (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 1-2.
12. Ordon Estate v Grail, [1998] 3 SCR 437. For a more detailed discussion, 
see ibid at 1-5.
13. ITO-Int Terminal Operators Ltd v Miida Electronics Inc, [1986] 1 SCR 
752 at 766, also citing Quebec North Shore Paper Co v Canadian Pacific 
Ltd, [1977] 2 SCR 1054 and McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd v The 
Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 654.
14. See e.g. Minister of National Revenue v RBC Life Insurance Co, 2013 FCA 
50, (the federal courts enjoy “plenary powers” analogous to the inherent 
powers of the provincial superior courts); Canadian Transit Co v Windsor 
(City), 2015 FCA 88 [Canadian Transit] (the federal courts have the 
jurisdiction to consider the constitutional doctrines of paramountcy and 
inter-jurisdictional immunity where they otherwise have jurisdiction).
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in adjudicating income tax appeals.15
Section 3 of the FCA constitutes the Federal Court of Appeal as a 
court of “law, equity, and admiralty in and for Canada”. Equity, it has 
been held, refers to those principles of law that were administered before 
1873 by the Courts of Equity (and mainly the Court of Chancery), 
rather than any general notion of what is just or fair.16 Thus, like the 
Federal Court, and notwithstanding that it is a creature of statute, the 
Federal Court of Appeal has the power to apply the doctrines of the 
Court of Chancery where the subject-matter of the dispute is otherwise 
within its jurisdiction and where equitable principles are applicable to 
the issue.17 In Algonquin Mercantile Corp v Dart Industries Canada Ltd, 
the Federal Court Trial Division described this equitable jurisdiction in 
the following terms:
[o]nce it has jurisdiction and subject only to any specific statutory provision 
to the contrary, the Federal Court of Canada may, in determining the issues 
before it, exercise all of the powers and enforce all of the remedies available 
to both courts of law and courts of equity. In other words, to dispose of any 
case before it, it may exercise the same powers and apply the same laws and 
principles as the Superior Court of the province where the cause of action lies.18 
In Apotex Inc v Abbott Laboratories Ltd,19 the Ontario Superior Court 
confirmed that it shared this expansive view of the Federal Court’s 
jurisdiction, rejecting the argument that it could award equitable relief 
to a party in a patent-based action in circumstances where the Federal 
Court had denied other patentees exactly the same remedy. 20
There is a relatively small body of case law shedding light on when 
the Federal Courts will, and when they will not, apply the rules of equity 
15. Canadian Transit, supra note 14 at para 38.
16. Maplesden v Minister of National Revenue, [1998] 2 CTC 162 (FCA) at 
para 27 [Maplesden].
17. Teledyne Industries Inc v Lido Industrial Products Ltd (1982), 68 CPR 
(2d) 204 (FC (TD)) at 227 [Teledyne]; Garford Pty v Dywidag Systems 
International Canada Ltd, 2010 FC 997 (TD)[Garford]. The Exchequer 
Court of Canada also had an equitable jurisdiction.
18. [1987] 2 FC 373 (TD) [Algonquin] at para 78.
19. 2013 ONSC 356.
20. Ibid at para 81 [Apotex].
39(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
to a matter brought before them.21 In perhaps the earliest case on point, 
Teledyne Industries Inc v Lido Industrial Products Ltd 22 (“Teledyne”), the 
Federal Court considered a claim that it should award prejudgment 
interest on equitable principles in an accounting of profits for patent 
infringement under the federal Patent Act.23 Section 40 of the FCA, which 
governed the claim, provided: “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Court, 
a judgment … bears interest from the time of giving the judgment”. 
The Federal Court held that this section neither granted nor limited any 
authority that the court might otherwise possess regarding pre-judgment 
interest and awarded the equitable relief claimed. According to Justice 
Addy, the fact that the fundamental right being protected was a statutory 
right did not remove or vary the “normal requirement” to apply “all 
relevant equitable principles in determining the nature and the extent of 
the relief to which the aggrieved party was entitled”.24 
Since Teledyne, the equitable jurisdiction of the Federal Courts 
has manifested (or not manifested) itself in a variety of different ways. 
The Federal Court of Appeal has invoked its equitable jurisdiction to 
enforce a party’s undertaking to pay damages25 and to grant a bill of 
discovery against the Minister of National Revenue in a patent dispute 
between two corporate parties.26 In other cases, it has refused to exercise 
its equitable jurisdiction to hear claims based on unjust enrichment27 or 
to vacate a tax assessment on equitable grounds.28 If there is a common 
theme in these decisions, it is the court’s central concern to determine the 
21. I speak here of the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal. 
There are, of course, other “small f ” federal courts, the extent of whose 
“equitable jurisdiction” would require separate analysis: see e.g. Pliskow v 
Canada, 2013 TCC 283.
22. Teledyne, supra note 17.
23. RSC 1985, c P-4.
24. Teledyne, supra note 17 at 230.
25. Algonquin, supra note 18. See also Beloit Canada Ltée c Valmet-Dominion 
Inc, [1997] 3 FC 497 (CA).
26. Glaxo Wellcome v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1998] 4 FC 439 
(CA) [Glaxo Wellcome].
27. Bédard v Kellogg, 2007 FC 516 (TD). See also Garford, supra note 17.
28. Maplesden, supra note 16.
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interplay between the rules of equity being invoked and the legislative 
provisions at issue.29 The Federal Court of Appeal has indicated that it 
will not shrink from applying an equitable principle simply because of 
its novelty in Canadian jurisprudence. 30 In cases where statutory and 
equitable tools overlap, however, the Court is tasked with determining 
“whether the legislation displaces or precludes resort to the common 
law or whether, conversely, the common law applies in addition to or 
in spite of the law set out in the legislation”.31 The legislature is generally 
presumed not to depart from prevailing law, unless it clearly expresses its 
intention to do so. However, this general presumption may be rebutted if 
it is clear the legislature intended to modify equitable rights by enacting 
a “comprehensive regulation of the matter at issue”.32 “Careful attention” 
must therefore be paid to the particular law under which jurisdiction is 
claimed.33 
The Federal Courts’ understanding of when a statutory regime 
precludes the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction can be illustrated by 
contrasting two decisions that came to opposite conclusions on the use of 
equitable tools. In Garford Pty Ltd v Dywidag Systems International Canada 
Ltd 34 (“Garford”), a plaintiff sought leave to amend a statement of claim 
based on section 36 of the federal Competition Act,35 in order to raise 
ancillary claims sounding in unjust enrichment.36 Section 36 provided 
that any person who had suffered loss due to breaches of the Competition 
Act was entitled to sue for “an amount equal to the loss or damage proved 
to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that 
the court may allow not exceeding [the cost of any investigation and 
the proceedings]”. Finding that section 36 provided a civil remedy that 
29. Glaxo Wellcome, supra note 26.
30. Ibid at para 33. 
31. Ibid at para 36 citing Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of 
Statutes, 3d (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 298.
32. Glaxo Wellcome, supra note 26 at para 36. 
33. Garford, supra note 17 at para 9. 
34. Ibid.
35. RSC 1985, c C-34.
36. Garford, supra note 17 at para 3.
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limited plaintiffs to the recovery of actual loss or damage, the Federal 
Court refused to grant the proposed amendment. The court reasoned 
that either the plaintiff was putting forth a new cause of action, in which 
case the matter was within provincial jurisdiction, or it was seeking a new 
remedy, in which case that remedy was outside the terms of section 36.37 
Section 3 of the FCA did not assist the plaintiff as that section did not 
give the Court a “general jurisdiction” to consider equitable claims and 
remedies in a civil case based on a statutory cause of action.38 
Garford may be contrasted with Glaxo Wellcome v Canada (Minister 
of National Revenue)39 (“Glaxo Wellcome”), a 1998 decision of the Federal 
Court of Appeal. In Glaxo Wellcome, the appellant sought to obtain from 
the Minister of National Revenue the names of unlicensed importers 
of a patented drug that the appellant believed was violating its patent 
rights. The federal Customs Act,40 which governed the appellant’s request, 
contained three relevant provisions:
• Section 107, which prohibited the Minister from disclosing 
information collected under the Act “except as authorized 
under section 108”;
• Subsection 108(1), which permitted the Minister to disclose 
information gathered pursuant to the Act to the Department 
of National Revenue or “any person” authorized by the 
Minister;
• Subsection 108(2), which authorized a court of record to 
order a customs officer to disclose information gathered 
pursuant to the Act.
When the Minister refused to release the names of the importers to the 
appellant under subsection 108(1), the appellant petitioned the Federal 
Court to grant it an equitable remedy “of ancient origin”, which would 
permit the court to order discovery of persons against whom the appellant 
37. Ibid at para 12.
38. Ibid at para 8.
39. Glaxo Wellcome, supra note 26.
40. RSC 1985, c 1 (2d Supp).
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had no cause of action.41 On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal agreed 
to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to provide the remedy sought. The 
Court reasoned that although Parliament had specifically designated 
the Minister as the decision-making authority regarding which persons 
should have access to information collected under the Act, the inclusion 
of section 108(2) indicated that Parliament did not intend to make the 
Minister the “sole arbiter of disclosure”.42 The Customs Act, in other words, 
was not “an exhaustive statutory code” which directly or by necessary 
implication prohibited the courts from incorporating equitable principles 
or remedies.43 Based on this reading of the Act, the Court exercised its 
jurisdiction to order an equitable bill of discovery, effectively requiring 
the Minister to disclose the names of the importers of the patented drug.
It is arguable that, at least in some earlier cases, the Federal Courts 
exhibited a particular reluctance to exercise their equitable jurisdiction 
in matters related to tax. In Maplesden v Minister of National Revenue 44 
(“Maplesden”), for example, a taxpayer asked the (then) Federal Court 
Trial Division to vacate a tax assessment on equitable grounds, arguing 
that it was Revenue Canada’s own erroneous actions that had caused the 
tax liability to arise. The Court held that it had no authority to grant the 
relief sought, distinguishing Teledyne on the basis of the statutory grant 
of authority conferred on the Court in that case, and noting that “tax 
laws were never part” of the regime administered by the English Court 
of Chancery.45 One year later,46 the same court relied on Maplesden in 
refusing to use its equitable jurisdiction to grant restitution to taxpayers 
in the face of limitations imposed by the Excise Tax Act.47 However, in 
Neles Controls Ltd v Canada,48 the Federal Court of Appeal brought its 
position on the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in tax matters in line 
41. Glaxo Wellcome, supra note 26 at para 20.
42. Ibid at para 42.
43. Ibid.
44. Maplesden, supra note 16.
45. Ibid at paras 27-28.
46. Federated Co-operatives Ltd v Canada (1999), 165 FTR 135. 
47. RSC 1985, c E-15.
48. 2002 FCA 107.
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with Glaxo Wellcome, holding that the determining factor in a claim for 
equitable relief of a tax overpayment was whether it was “precluded by a 
comprehensive statutory scheme”.49 Even in the tax context, the Court 
suggested, an exercise of its equitable jurisdiction could be warranted “in 
situations where the legislation is silent, where it cannot apply, or where 
a gap in relief is apparent”.50
III. The Role of Equitable Principles in the Common 
Law of Charities
If we turn from the general nature of the Federal Courts’ equitable 
jurisdiction to the specific nature of the jurisdiction that Chancery 
traditionally exercised over charities, we see that the latter jurisdiction 
had a few central features. On the one hand, equity subjected charitable 
trusts and corporations to a standard of control and scrutiny even more 
rigorous than that applied to private trusts.51 On the other hand, equity 
treated charities as entitled to “extraordinary favor”.52 Charities were 
largely exempt from the rule against perpetuities, for example, and the 
Chancellor would not allow a statute of limitations to bar an action to 
enforce a charitable use.53 In recognition of the public interest in charity 
property, the Court of Chancery also developed a number of curative 
principles that oriented the court towards the effectuation of charitable 
gifts. The following section identifies some of these curative principles, 
explains how they functioned, and points to various places in Canada’s 
49. Ibid at para 15.
50. Ibid. 
51. Hubert Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities, 4d (West 
Sussex: Bloomsbury, 2010) at 528 [Picarda], citing A-G v Gleg (1738), 
Amb 584 (Ch (Eng)); A-G v The Governors of Sherborne Grammar School 
(1854), 18 Beav 256 (Ch (Eng)). See also A-G v Governors of Harrow 
School (1754), 28 ER 351 (Ch), and Re Devlin’s Estate (1889), 23 LR Ir 
516 (Ch)(where the Chancery Court required a charity trustee to swear an 
affidavit stating how he would exercise his discretion before charity funds 
were paid out of court). 
52. Jackson v Phillips (1867), 96 Mass (14 Allen) 539 (USSC) at 550 
[Jackson].
53. Jones, supra note 1 at 18.
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registered charity jurisprudence where their exercise might have altered 
the course of a charitable registration appeal.
A. Benignant Construction
A first equitable principle that distinguishes the law of charities from the 
broader law of trusts is that a court may give a benignant construction 
to a document in order to carry into effect a donor’s charitable intent. 
“In regard to the construction of charitable gifts … the rule of widest 
application is that the court leans in favour of charity”.54 Where a gift is 
capable of two constructions, one of which would make it void and the 
other effectual, the latter construction is to be preferred.55 There are limits 
to the principle of benignant construction: the court, it is sometimes 
said, must not “strain a will” to gain money for a charity.56 Where the 
terms of a gift permit the trustees to apply the trust fund to charity or 
some other non-charitable purpose, the gift may be found too uncertain 
to be valid. Even in such circumstances, however, courts of equity have 
sometimes saved an unfortunately worded gift, construing the word 
‘or’ conjunctively on the basis of either the ejusdem generis principle, 
benignant construction, or the testator’s charitable intent.57 
The Canadian courts have occasionally applied the principle of 
benignant construction to save a charitable gift. A leading authority 
is Jones v T. Eaton Co58 (“Jones”), a case which concerned the validity 
of a bequest to the Eaton Company’s executive officers “to be used by 
them as a trust fund for any needy or deserving Toronto members of 
the Eaton Quarter Century Club as the said Executive Officers in their 
54. Jean Warburton et al, Tudor on Charities 9d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2003) at 175 [Warburton].
55. Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen, [1979] 1 All ER 588 (CA 
(Civ)) citing Houston v Burns, [1918] AC 337 (HL) at 341-42 and Re 
Bain, Public Trustee v Ross, [1930] 1 Ch 224 (CA (Eng)) at 230. See also 
Bruce v Presbytery of Deer (1867), LR 1 SC 96 (HL) at 97.
56. Warburton, supra note 54 at 176, citing Dolan v Macdermot (1868), LR 3 
Ch 676 (Eng) at 678.
57. Picarda, supra note 51 at 330-31.
58. [1973] SCR 635.
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absolute discretion may decide”.59 Before the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the argument focused on whether the word “or” must be interpreted 
disjunctively or conjunctively, and whether the word “deserving” was 
too vague to communicate a charitable intent. The Court found it 
unnecessary to deal with the first argument, but upheld the validity of 
the trust on the basis that the testator was expressing a charitable intent 
when he used the word “deserving”.60 Citing English authority for the 
principle that charitable bequests must receive a benignant construction, 
the Court held that in the context of the bequest, the word “deserving” 
must be understood to refer to a person “who although not actually 
poverty-stricken was nevertheless in a state of financial depression”.61 On 
the strength of this construction, a unanimous Court concluded that the 
disputed bequest was a valid charitable trust. 
If the Supreme Court of Canada has invoked the principle of 
benignant construction in construing the terms of an allegedly charitable 
bequest, it has been more equivocal on the role of the equitable principle 
in construing allegedly charitable objects for purposes of the registered 
charity regime. This is the conclusion that must be drawn from Vancouver 
Society, where the Court was called upon to determine whether the 
purposes and activities of the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and 
Visible Minority Women were charitable so as to qualify the organization 
for charitable registration under the ITA. The objects of the Society 
included, inter alia:
(a) to provide educational forums, classes, workshops and seminars to 
immigrant women in order that they may be able to find or obtain employment 
or self-employment ...; and
(e) to provide services and to do all such things that are incidental or conducive 
to the attainment of the above stated objects, including the seeking of funds 
from governments and/or other sources for the implementation of the 
aforementioned objectives.62
The Supreme Court of Canada held that object (a) was charitable, a 
59. Ibid at 637.
60. Ibid at 642.
61. Ibid at 646.
62. Vancouver Society, supra note 7 at paras 129-35. 
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conclusion that was only made possible by the Court’s bold expansion 
of the educational head of charity to include more informal training 
initiatives aimed at teaching necessary and practical life skills.63 However, 
the appellant’s case fell on object (e), with a majority of the Court 
concluding that the inclusion of the words “or conducive” placed the 
Society as a whole “outside the scope of legal charity”.64 
Vancouver Society provides a dramatic illustration of the potential for 
the rules of equity to influence the outcome of charitable registration 
appeals. The Supreme Court of Canada’s majority and dissenting 
judgments ran, together, for over 200 paragraphs, addressing a number 
of difficult and substantive questions regarding the scope of the registered 
charities regime. Nevertheless, the issue on which the majority and 
dissenting judges ultimately split was the proper construction of the 
Society’s final object. Justice Gonthier, while not explicitly invoking 
the principle of benignant construction, appeared to rely on it in spirit. 
Writing in dissent, he found that the “obvious intent” of the drafter 
of object (e) was to provide a mechanism by which the Society’s main 
(and charitable) purpose could be achieved.65 Moreover, Gonthier J 
stated, based on the Court’s decision in Jones, it would be erroneous to 
simply assume that the term “or” should be interpreted disjunctively in 
construing an allegedly charitable object.66 Finally, Gonthier J noted that 
in an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Canada had affirmed the validity 
of an association constituted to do things “incidental or conducive” to 
the attainment of its charitable objects.67 The conclusion that begged to 
be drawn was that the language raised no concerns.68
The majority judges evaluated the Society’s final object through a far 
less benignant lens. Writing for the majority, Justice Iacobucci opined 
that while doing things “incidental” to the attainment of charitable 
purposes could safely be treated as a means of fulfillment of those 
63. Ibid at paras 166-74.
64. Ibid at para 116.
65. Ibid at para 118.
66. Ibid at para 119.
67. Ibid at para 120.
68. Ibid at paras 117-21.
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purposes, the term “conducive” implied only that the action contributed 
to that result.69 Based on this reading of object (e), and bolstered by his 
view that the Society had previously carried out non-charitable activities 
that would be covered by the word “conducive”, Iacobucci J concluded 
that the Society could not be classified as a charitable organization.70 It 
was an odd end to the Vancouver Society story, particularly as no party had 
raised an objection to object (e) in either written or oral argument.71 As 
the decision stands, however, the majority’s actual construction of object 
(e) sits in tension with its earlier endorsement of relying on equitable 
principles to determine charitable status under the ITA. This tension 
goes some way in explaining why the Federal Court of Appeal has not 
mentioned the principle of benignant construction in the twenty-odd 
charitable registration appeals it has decided since.72
B. Presumption of Lawful Trustee Behaviour
A second equitable principle that tends towards the effectuation of 
charitable gifts is closely related to the first. Where the terms of an 
69. Ibid at para 193.
70. Ibid at para 195. 
71. See ibid at para 116, per Gonthier J. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
since confirmed that an appellate court may only raise new issues on its 
own initiative when failing to do so would risk an injustice: see R v Mian, 
2014 SCC 54 at para 41; Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat, 2015 
SCC 30 at para 26.
72. The registered charities jurisprudence contains a singular, passing reference 
to the principle of benignant construction. In Vancouver Regional FreeNet, 
supra note 6, Justice Décary in dissent described the majority of the 
Federal Court of Appeal as having “applied a benignant construction” in 
construing the Native Communications Society’s “deficient constituting 
document” as charitable at para 42. It does seem likely that the Court 
implicitly relied on the equitable principle in Native Communications, 
one of the few successful charitable registration appeals. In recent years, 
however, the Federal Court of Appeal has neither relied upon nor rejected 
the equitable principle. The Supreme Court of Canada did not address 
benignant construction in the AYSA Amateur Youth Soccer Association v 
Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42 [AYSA] decision, but arguably 
construed the appellant’s objects strictly at para 41.
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otherwise charitable trust allow for the possibility of improper action, 
equity allows the court to presume that the trustees will act in a lawful 
and appropriate way.73 In McGovern v A-G,74 Justice Slade applied this 
presumption in support of his conclusion, in obiter dicta, that a trust for 
the undertaking and dissemination of research into the maintenance and 
observance of human rights would be a valid charitable trust.75 The “mere 
theoretical possibility” that trustees might implement these objects in a 
political manner would not render them non-charitable, Slade J held, 
as the clauses would be entitled to a benignant construction and “to the 
presumption … that the trustees would only act in a lawful and proper 
manner appropriate to the trustees of a charity and not, for example, by 
the propagation of tendentious political opinions”.76 In Re Koeppler’s Will 
Trusts,77 the English Court of Appeal relied on this presumption of lawful 
trustee behaviour in upholding a gift for the furtherance of potentially 
political work.78 
Equity’s presumption of lawful trustee behavior is not irrefutable; 
in cases where it is unclear whether an organization’s objects are 
exclusively charitable and trustees have acted pursuant to those purposes, 
extrinsic evidence of those acts is admissible for purposes of clarifying 
the charitable nature of the enterprise.79 However, the Federal Court of 
Appeal has not allowed applicants for registered charity status to benefit 
from the presumption of lawful trustee behaviour, even absent any 
73. Warburton, supra note 54 at 175-76; Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 205 [Luxton].
74. McGovern v A-G, [1982] Ch 321 (CA)(Eng)).
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid at 353, 346 (the court should infer that trustees will act lawfully 
and only use means appropriate to the trustees of the charity). See also, 
Southwood and Parsons v AG [1998] EWHC Ch 297 at para 15.
77. [1986] Ch 423 (CA (Civ)(Eng)). 
78. Ibid at 438. The gift was for the furtherance of the Wilton Park project 
which organized and conducted conferences on a wide variety of topics, 
some of which, the Court acknowledged, had a political flavour.
79. Guaranty Trust Co of Canada v Minister of National Revenue, [1967] SCR 
133. See also, Warburton, supra note 54.
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evidence of improper acts. In Travel Just v Canada (Revenue Agency),80 for 
example, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the appeal of a not-for-
profit corporation that had not carried out any activities or even accrued 
any funds before unsuccessfully applying to the Minister for charitable 
registration.81 The objects of the organization included the creation and 
development of “model tourism development projects that contribute 
to the realization of international human rights and environmental 
norms”.82 In rejecting this object as excessively broad and vague, the 
Court stated that the development of such model tourism development 
projects could include “the financing and operation of luxury holiday 
resorts in developing countries”.83 The Court implied that this would be 
an unlawful or at least inappropriate usage of charity funds, but did not 
address the appellant’s argument that it was entitled to the presumption 
that its trustees would not use the funds in this way.84 In the result, 
despite the absence of any evidence of improper trustee behavior, the 
organization’s appeal was dismissed.
C. Resolution of Technical Defects
A third equitable principle that tends towards the effectuation of 
charitable gifts authorizes the court to perfect an otherwise charitable 
transfer that suffers from a technical defect.85 As Lord Eldon stated in 
Moggridge v Thackwell 86 (“Moggridge”):
if the testator has manifested a general intention to give to charity, the failure of 
the particular mode in which the charity is to be effectuated shall not destroy 
the charity: but, if the substantial intention is charity, the law will substitute 
80. 2006 FCA 343 [Travel Just].
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid at para 9. 
83. Ibid at para 6.
84. Travel Just, Factum of the Appellant at para 39. I was involved in the 
preparation of the appellant’s factum.
85. Jones, supra note 1 at 60-68, 80. It was originally thought that this 
jurisdiction flowed from the preamble of the 1601 Statute, but by the late 
17th century it was accepted that imperfect transfers could be perfected in 
Chancery, even if the proceedings were brought by bill or information. 
86. (1803), 7 Ves 36 (Ch (Eng)).
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another mode of devoting the property to charitable purposes, though the 
formal intention as to the mode cannot be accomplished.87 
A court of equity may intervene to perfect an otherwise charitable transfer 
where a donor’s directions are indefinite, ambiguous, or insufficient. It may 
also intervene where the prescribed manner of carrying out the donor’s 
general charitable intention is illegal.88 In Re Bradwell,89 for example, the 
Court of Chancery considered a contested bequest with a direction to 
accumulate income and apply the proceeds of the accumulation to the 
benefit of Wesleyan ministers. The direction was in plain violation of 
the governing property law statute. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery 
rejected the argument that the bequest was invalid. As the testator had 
expressed his intention that his estate “be, in substance, applied for 
charitable purposes,” the Court held that the fact that he had chosen 
an illegal mode for effecting those purposes should not undermine the 
bequest.90 The function of a court of equity in such circumstances was 
not to declare the gift invalid, but rather to carry the testator’s charitable 
intention into effect through an administrative or cy-près scheme.
Canadian case law includes several examples of superior courts 
exercising the curative power described in Moggridge. Most often it 
has been invoked to effectuate indefinite or ambiguous gifts, such as a 
bequest “to the work of the Lord”.91 In recent years, however, at least one 
provincial superior court has relied on its scheme-making powers to bring 
a charitable trust into conformity with the rules of the registered charity 
regime. In Toronto Aged Men’s and Women’s Homes v Loyal True Blue and 
87. Ibid at 69.
88. A gift will fail if the general intention is illegal or contrary to public 
policy. However, if it is evident that the donor had a general charitable 
intention, but the prescribed manner of carrying of the intention is illegal, 
the court will execute the gift cy-pres; see Picarda, supra note 51 at 450-
51.
89. [1952] Ch 575 (Eng)) [Bradwell].
90. Ibid at 579-80. 
91. See e.g. Re Brooks Estate (1969), 4 DLR (3d) 694 (Sask QB). See also 
Re Leslie, [1940] OWN 345 (SC) and Phelps v Lord, [1894] 25 OR 
259.  
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Orange Home,92 the testatrix had created an endowment under which 
the trustees were to retain the capital of the residue, while distributing 
the income to charitable beneficiaries.93 The trust was subsequently 
registered as a private foundation under the ITA, which placed upon 
the trust a requirement to disburse annually an amount equal to at least 
4.5% of the fair market value of its property.94 Since the trustees had no 
power to encroach on the capital of the residue, they were in a difficult 
position: compliance with the ITA would require them to breach their 
trust, while a failure to comply would entitle the Minister of Customs 
and Revenue to revoke the trust’s charitable registration and render it 
liable to a ruinous revocation tax. In these circumstances, the court had 
“no real concern” with exercising its equitable jurisdiction to declare the 
trust “impracticable” and to order a cy-près scheme that expanded the 
investment and distribution powers of the trustees.95
Assuming that the Federal Court of Appeal has all the same equitable 
powers as the superior courts with respect to disputes within its jurisdiction, 
it has never followed the Ontario Superior Court in exercising a scheme-
making power to bring an imperfect applicant for registered charity status 
into conformity with the ITA. One applicant for registered charity status 
that might have benefited from such an exercise of the Court’s equitable 
jurisdiction is the Fuaran Foundation, a religious not-for-profit society 
that appealed a negative registration decision in 2004. 96 The Minister of 
National Revenue had refused to register the Foundation as a charitable 
organization on the ground that its objects permitted the distribution of 
resources to persons who were not “qualified donees” under the ITA. The 
constitution of the Foundation provided, in relevant part:
[t]he objects and purposes of the Foundation are to advance the Christian 
Religion and to advance education by undertaking programs and projects in 
pursuit of its purposes as are exclusively charitable at law by … (a) providing 
financial assistance for the establishment and continued support of individual 
92. (2003), 68 OR (3d) 777 (SupCtJ).
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid at para 14.
95. Ibid at para 15.
96. Fuaran Foundation v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2004 FCA 
181 [Fuaran Foundation].
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Christians and Christian organizations engaged worldwide in [Christian 
teaching and poverty relief.]97
In presenting its case for charitable registration, the society submitted 
that its constitution “clearly and expressly” limited the discretion of its 
trustees to the carrying out of projects that were exclusively charitable at 
law.98 The Fuaran Foundation also invoked the principle of benignant 
construction and offered to specifically undertake that its directors would 
only donate to “qualified donees” as the ITA required.99 Nevertheless, 
the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Minister’s refusal to register the 
society on the ground that the language of the constitution was broad 
enough to allow the trustees to undertake “non-charitable activities” 
under the ITA, including the provision of financial assistance to non-
qualified donees.100 Neither the parties nor the court appeared to consider 
whether the Federal Court of Appeal might invoke the scheme-making 
powers of the Court of Chancery to affirm the validity of the charity and 
to cure its illegal mode.101
IV. Is it Appropriate to Invoke Equitable Doctrines 
in the Application of the Registered Charity 
Regime?
In Part II of this work, I argued that, subject to any specific statutory 
provision to the contrary, the Federal Court of Appeal has the authority to 
exercise all of the equitable powers of the Court of Chancery in determining 
matters properly before it. In Part III, I described some of the specific 
doctrines and powers that characterized the Chancery jurisdiction over 
charities. I identified places in the registered charity jurisprudence where 
those tools were conspicuously absent and explored how those absences 
contributed to the negative resolution of each charitable registration 
appeal. The question that remains is whether the Federal Court of Appeal 
97. Ibid at para 6. 
98. Fuaran Foundation, Factum of the Appellant at paras 45 and 53.
99. Ibid at para 10.
100. Fuaran Foundation, supra note 96 at para 6.
101. Ibid at para 11.
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should actually apply these curative doctrines in determining whether an 
organization’s purposes and activities are exclusively charitable under the 
ITA. Despite Vancouver Society’s suggestion that a court’s determination 
of registered charity status is an exercise of its equitable jurisdiction in 
matters of charity, such application would clearly be a departure from the 
status quo. In the final part of this piece, I address some of the arguments 
in favour of having the Federal Court of Appeal act as a court of equity 
in the adjudication of charitable registration appeals, as well as some of 
the possible objections to that position. 
A. The “Moving” Nature of Charity Law
For those concerned about the Canadian law of charities having long 
since ceased to be the “moving subject” described by Lord Wilberforce,102 
there are several compelling arguments for having the Federal Court of 
Appeal apply the traditional doctrines of the Court of Chancery in the 
adjudication of charitable registration appeals. A first is that it might give 
applicants for registered charity status a fighting chance in challenging 
the decisions of the Minister. With no not-for-profit organization having 
won a charitable registration appeal in almost twenty years, and even 
Vancouver Society having been lost on the basis of the strict construction 
of an ancillary object, unsuccessful applicants for registered charity status 
are today generally being advised to surrender or reconstitute themselves, 
rather than appeal even questionable revenue decisions. This trend is 
evidenced by the steady decrease in the number of charitable registration 
appeals that have been brought in recent years.103 
Less litigation is not, of course, problematic in itself. However, the 
cumulative result of the dramatic record of losses at the Federal Court of 
Appeal has arguably been the near eradication, in Canada, of the common 
law method of developing the legal definition of charity by judicial 
102. Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow Corporation, 
[1968] AC 138 (HL). 
103. From 1999 to 2008, 13 different organizations appealed negative 
registration decisions to the Federal Court – an average of more than one 
appeal per year. Betweem 2009 and the time of writing, there had only 
been four charitable registration appeals.
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analogy. The recent charitable registration decisions of the Federal Court 
of Appeal can scarcely claim to be charity law decisions at all, so brief are 
their reasons and so fleeting their allusions to the appellants’ disputed 
objects.104 For a jurisdiction with no statutory definition of charity, the 
effect of this trend is to tether the concept of charity ever more rigidly to 
a dated body of English case law. In addition to causing frustration for 
not-for-profit litigants, the disappearance of the common law analogical 
method is at odds with the apparent design of the registered charity 
regime. In Vancouver Society, Gonthier J described that regime as a signal 
of Parliament’s acceptance that the courts “have a continuing role to play” 
in keeping the definition of charity in tune with social and economic 
developments.105 If we accept that analysis, we may regard the current 
trend not only as a loss to the sector, but as a subversion of Parliamentary 
intent. 
B. Federal-Provincial Consistency
A second principal argument in favour of having the Federal Court of 
Appeal exercise the curative powers of equity in charitable registration 
appeals is that such exercise would better align the federal charities 
jurisprudence with the charity law of the provinces. Based on the 
comments of certain members of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is 
arguably an open question whether there is still a single “common law of 
charities” in Canada or whether the field is split between the common 
law of the provinces and the “common law” of the federal courts.106 The 
majority decision in Vancouver Society supports the better view that the 
104. See Humanics Institute v Minister of National Revenue, 2014 FCA 265; 
World Job and Food Bank Inc v R, 2013 FCA 65 and Sagkeeng Memorial 
Arena Inc v Minister of National Revenue, 2012 FCA 171.
105. Vancouver Society, supra note 7 at para 28, per Gonthier J (The Supreme 
Court of Canada has subsequently stated that the scheme of the ITA 
“does not support a wide expansion of the definition of charity” and that 
“wholesale reform” is best left to Parliament, but it has not denied this 
continuing role); see AYSA, supra note 72 at paras 43-44.
106. Vancouver Society, supra note 7 at para 28, per Gonthier J. See also AYSA, 
supra note 72.
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Federal Court of Appeal draws upon and contributes to a single equitable 
tradition that was received by the provinces from England when it 
interprets the statutory term “charitable” under the ITA.107 If this is the 
case, it follows that the federal and provincial courts should rely on the 
same equitable principles in developing this body of law. If, on the other 
hand, there are effectively two common laws of charity in Canada, it is 
nonetheless the case that each of these bodies of law tends to influence 
each other.108 In either case, therefore, it must be considered preferable 
that the same body of equitable principles apply throughout.
C. Equity and Charitable Corporations
If there are compelling arguments in favour of having the Federal Court 
of Appeal act as a court of equity in the adjudication of charitable 
registration appeals, there are also predictable objections to this approach. 
A first is that the majority of applicants for registered charity status are 
corporations rather than trusts. To the extent that this objection reflects 
a view that corporate charities fell outside the traditional jurisdiction of 
the courts of equity, it can be dealt with in short order. While Chancery’s 
jurisdiction over charities tends to be portrayed as a branch of its inherent 
jurisdiction over trusts,109 and the two jurisdictions undoubtedly overlap, 
107. For a discussion, see Kathryn Chan, “Taxing Charities/Imposer les 
Organismes de Bienfaisance: Harmonization and Dissonance in Canadian 
Charity Law” (2007) 55 Canadian Tax Journal 481.
108. There are a number of provincial charity law decisions, for instance, 
that have relied on Vancouver Society: these include Re TLC The Land 
Conservancy of British Columbia Inc No S36826, 2014 BCSC 97 at paras 
221-26; Cassano v Toronto Dominion Bank (2009), 98 OR (3d) 543 (SC) 
at paras 28, 29; Save the Heritage Simpson Covenant Society v Kelowna 
(City), 2008 BCSC 1084 at paras 112, 113, 115; Chénier v Canada 
(Attorney General) (2005), 12 CBR (5th) 173 (Ont Sup Ct J) at para 47; 
and Alberta Assn for Community Living v Alberta (Municipal Government 
Board), 2000 ABQB 263 at para 29.
109. Picarda, supra note 51 at 729, noting that the 8th edition of Warburton 
suggested that the inherent jurisdiction depended exclusively on the 
existence of a trust. See also Construction Industry Training Board v A-G, 
[1973] Ch 173 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at 176.
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the judicial power to cure uncertain and defective charitable dispositions 
predates the legal form of the trust and was historically applied by the 
Chancellor to a variety of charitable vehicles.110 Because of the manifest 
authority of the Crown, the Court of Chancery admittedly had a very 
limited authority to administer charitable corporations founded by 
statute or Royal Charter.111 That being said, the court would intervene in 
the administration of a charitable corporation where there was no other 
person to ensure that the charitable funds were being properly managed 
or where it could find within the corporate structure a trust upon which 
its authority could be based.112 Modern Canadian courts have confirmed 
that, because of the trust-like obligations of corporate charities, “the court 
maintains its supervisory scheme-making power whether a charity’s legal 
form is as a charitable trust or a charitable corporation”.113 Thus, there 
is little merit in the argument that the Federal Court of Appeal has no 
equitable jurisdiction over charitable corporations per se.114
A more challenging question is whether the principle that the 
court leans in favour of charity extends to the construction of corporate 
documents or whether it applies only where a disposition of property would 
otherwise be void. Several English cases have considered this question but 
the case law does not provide a unanimous response. In Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Oldham Training and Enterprise Council 115 (“Oldham”), 
110. Jones, supra note 1 at 5, 59, 80. See also Marion R Fremont-Smith, 
Foundations and Government: State and Federal Law and Supervision (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965) at 17.
111. Warburton, supra note 54 at 131, 371-73.
112. For a more detailed explanation of the court’s historical jurisdiction 
over charitable corporations, see Maurice Cullity, “The Charitable 
Corporation: a ‘Bastard’ Legal Form Revisited” (2001) 17 The 
Philanthropist 17 at 19-23. See also Kathryn Chan, The Public-Private 
Nature of Charity Law (Oxford: Hart Bloomsbury, 2016) at ch 2.
113. Re Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada (2000), 184 DLR (4th) 445 
(Ont CA) at para 71. This is to ensure that gifts made with charitable 
intent will not fail even if the object of the gift is unclear or uncertain, or 
contains a technical defect.
114. Ibid. 
115. [1996] STC 1218 (Ch (CA)(Eng)) [Oldham]. 
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the Chancery Division of the High Court refused to bring the principle 
of benignant construction in aid of a not-for-profit company that sought 
to benefit from an exemption available to charities under the applicable 
UK legislation. Justice Lightman opined that so far as he could see, the 
principle “only applies where a provision or a gift will be held void and 
fail unless held charitable … I cannot see how this principle has any 
application where the validity of the provision or gift is not affected by 
the determination whether the gift is charitable or not”.116 However, in 
the earlier case of Guild v Inland Revenue Commissioners117 (“Guild”), the 
House of Lords had no hesitation in applying the doctrine of benignant 
construction in circumstances where the validity of the disposition was 
not in issue.118 The First-Tier Tribunal acknowledged these competing 
approaches in the recent Human Dignity Trust v The Charity Commission 
For England and Wales119 decision, but found it “unnecessary in the 
circumstances” to comment on the availability of benignant construction 
to a corporate body seeking charitable status.120 However, a benignant 
approach has been taken with regards to statutory corporations in other 
jurisdictions.121 Given the scope of the traditional Chancery jurisdiction 
and the strange consequences that might arise from having different rules 
of construction for different types of charitable institutions, the better 
argument seems to be that the favourable posture towards charity should 
extend to all charities, regardless of form.122 
D. Equity and Tax
Another set of objections to having the Federal Court of Appeal apply 
the tools of equity in adjudicating charitable registration appeals relate 
to the particular statutory context in which that adjudication takes 
116. Ibid at 1235.
117. [1992] 2 AC 310 (HL) [Guild].
118. Ibid at 316.
119. [2014] UK First Tier Tribunal 2013_0013_B (General Regulatory 
Chamber). 
120. Ibid at paras 18, 19, 29.
121. CIR v Medical Council of NZ, [1997] 2 NZLR 297 (CA) at 318. 
122. Luxton, supra note 73 at 204.
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place. Within the context of the ITA, the Court’s determination that an 
appellant’s purposes and activities are exclusively charitable results in the 
appellant being subject to both the significant tax advantages and the 
significant regulatory burdens of registered charity status.123 It also results 
in the overturning of a decision of the Minister of National Revenue. In 
these circumstances, two questions must be considered. First, as a general 
matter, do the curative principles of equity apply where an allegedly 
charitable instrument is being construed for tax purposes? Second, in the 
specific context of the registered charity regime, has Parliament precluded 
resort to the rules of equity by enacting a comprehensive code?
With regard to the general question, we may once again seek 
guidance from the conflicting decisions of the English courts. In Oldham, 
the High Court refused to apply the principle of benignant construction 
to a party seeking a charitable tax exemption on the ground that the 
favourable rules of equity were only applicable where the gift would 
be otherwise void. However, the House of Lords espoused a different 
approach in Guild. Guild was the executor of the estate of one James 
Russell, a man who bequeathed part of his estate to a town council “for 
the use in connection with the sports centre in New Berwick or some 
similar purpose in connection with sport”. The Inner House of the Court 
of Session approved a cy-près scheme in connection with the bequest, but 
the Inland Revenue subsequently ruled that the property had not been 
“given to charities” for purposes of a capital transfer tax exemption124 
under the Finance Act 1975.125 
Before the House of Lords, the argument focused on whether the 
sports centre qualified as a charity under the Recreational Charities Act 
1958,126 and whether the second branch of the bequest, referring to 
123. Canadian courts have tended to emphasize the benefits rather than 
the burdens of regulatory status: see, for example, Vancouver Society, 
supra note 7 at para 128. However, the burdens are also significant: see 
generally Jonathan Garton, Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).
124. Guild, supra note 117 at 317.
125. (UK), c 7, Sch. 6, s 10.
126. (UK), c 17 6, s 1.
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“some similar purpose in connection with sport”, was so widely expressed 
as to admit of the funds being applied in a manner inconsistent with 
that legislation.127 The executor urged the court to apply a benignant 
construction to the bequest, while the commissioners argued that a 
benignant construction should not be applied, “since the question was 
not whether the trust was valid or invalid, but whether it qualified for 
exemption from tax”.128 The House of Lords favoured the executor’s 
approach, holding: 
the importation into [Scottish] law, for tax purposes of the technical English 
law of charities involves that a Scottish judge should approach any question 
of construction arising out of the language used in the relevant instrument in 
the same manner as would an English judge who had to consider its validity 
as a charitable gift. The English judge would adopt the benignant approach 
in setting about that task, and so the Scottish judge dealing with the tax 
consequences should do likewise.129
Adopting a benignant construction, the House of Lords concluded that 
the testator’s intention had been that any “similar purpose” to which the 
town council might apply his bequest should display the characteristics 
that qualified the first bequest as a charity.130 Both bequests had therefore 
been “given to charities” for purposes of the taxation regime.
Taken together with the Supreme Court of Canada’s comments in 
Vancouver Society, Guild provides a persuasive argument that, as a general 
matter, the Federal Court of Appeal should approach the construction 
of purportedly charitable instruments in the same manner as would a 
Chancery judge considering the validity of charitable gifts, regardless 
of the tax consequences of the decision. Parliament retains the power 
to preclude or modify such an equitable approach, as we have seen, by 
creating a “comprehensive regulation” for charitable registration and 
its associated appeals.131 The Supreme Court of Canada implied in 
Vancouver Society that Parliament had not done this, and that the ITA 
envisaged a resort to “the common law” and “the equitable jurisdiction” 
127. Guild, supra note 117 at 317.
128. Ibid at 322.
129. Ibid at 323.
130. Ibid.
131. Glaxo Wellcome, supra note 26 at para 36.
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for the principles that should guide the court in applying the definition 
of charity.132 The question that remains is whether subsequent statutory 
changes have so transformed the registered charity regime as to prohibit 
the Federal Court of Appeal from invoking the curative doctrines of 
equity in adjudicating charitable registration appeals.
The statutory framework governing the charitable registration process 
has not undergone radical changes since Vancouver Society was decided in 
1999. The Minister of National Revenue’s authority to register qualified 
organizations continues to flow from subsection 248(1) of the ITA, which 
defines a “registered charity” (organisme de bienfaisance enregistré) as:
[a] charitable organization, private foundation or public foundation, within 
the meanings assigned by subsection 149.1(1) [or a branch thereof ], that is 
registered in Canada and was either created or established in Canada…that has 
applied to the Minister in prescribed form and that is at that time registered as 
a charitable organization, private foundation or public foundation. 
L’organisme suivant, qui a présenté au ministre une demande d’enregistrement 
sur formulaire prescrit et qui est enregistré, au moment considéré, comme 
oeuvre de bienfaisance, comme fondation privée ou comme fondation 
publique … au sens du paragraphe 149.1(1), qui réside au Canada et qui y a 
été constituée ou y est établie.
The subsection 149.1(1) definitions of a “charitable organization” and 
“charitable foundation” continue to rely heavily on the largely undefined 
concepts of “charitable purposes” (fins de bienfaisance) and “charitable 
activities” (activités de bienfaisance).133 If the Minister decides that an 
applicant for registered charity status does not meet the criteria for 
registration under 149.1(1), an appeal lies from that decision to the 
132. Vancouver Society, supra note 7 at para 28. In 2007, the SCC also rejected 
the argument that the Registered Canadian Amateur Athletic Associations 
regime was a complete code for amateur sporting activities, or that it 
indicated an intent to modify the meaning of charity under the ITA: See 
AYSA, supra note 72 at para 23.
133. Subsection 149.1(1) also requires that no part of the income of either 
entity be available for the personal benefit of any proprietor, member, 
shareholder, trustee or settlor: ITA, supra note 4, at s 149.1(1), “charitable 
organization” (oeuvre de bienfaisance) and “charitable foundation” 
(fondation de bienfaisance).
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Federal Court of Appeal.134
Within this largely similar framework, one may identify two 
statutory changes that arguably signal a slight shifting away from the 
regime’s traditional reliance on the charity law tradition of the Chancery 
court. First, Parliament has recently provided slightly more direction on 
what purposes and activities are charitable under the ITA, primarily by 
clarifying that it is not a “charitable purpose” to fund the political activities 
of another charity.135 This amendment achieves a minor narrowing of the 
legislative gaps that have historically been filled in by the common law 
of charities, but is a long way from filling them in completely. Second, 
Parliament has introduced an internal appeals process for charitable 
registration decisions, requiring persons who want to appeal a failed 
application for registered charity status to first serve a written notice of 
objection on the Minister, and giving the Minister 90 days to respond.136 
This amendment has, to some extent, shifted decision-making authority 
over registered charity status away from the Federal Court of Appeal, 
and towards an administrative unit that has no equitable powers of its 
own.137 Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Appeal continues to be vested 
with sole authority to hear appeals of the Minister’s decision, and to 
review “extricable questions of law”, such as the proper approach to the 
construction of charitable objects on the standard of correctness.138 While 
both of these amendments move the registered charity regime some way 
134. This is the combined effect of ITA, supra note 4, at ss 149.1(22), 168(4), 
172(3)(a.1).
135. As per s 149.1(1) of the ITA, “‘charitable purposes’ includes the 
disbursement of funds to a qualified donee, other than a gift the making 
of which is a political activity.” This definition was introduced in 2012, in 
Bill C-38, Jobs, Growth, and Long-term Prosperity Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 
2012 (assented to 29 June 2012), RSC 2012 c 19.
136. ITA, supra note 4, at s 172(3)(a.1).
137. For a description of the motivation for s 168(4), see Terrance S Carter 
and Theresa LM Man, “March 2004 Federal Budget Rewrites Tax Rules 
for Charities” Charity Law Bulletin No. 41 at 1, online: <www.carters.ca/
pub/bulletin/charity/2004/chylb41-04.pdf>.
138. Prescient Foundation v Minister of National Revenue, 2013 FCA 120 at 
para 12. 
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towards being a more comprehensive regime, therefore, neither provides 
a basis to presume that Parliament intended to preclude the application 
of equitable principles and doctrines in the determination of charitable 
registration appeals.
V. Conclusion
The equitable principles and doctrines that make up the common 
law charities tradition were, to a large extent, developed by the Court 
of Chancery in order to mitigate the rigour of the law and effectuate 
imperfect charitable gifts.139 As the epicenter of Canadian charity law has 
shifted from the trust law to the tax law domain, the curative principles 
of equity have all but disappeared from view. The exclusion of these 
equitable principles from the registered charity jurisprudence has had a 
discernable impact on the development of charity law in Canada and has 
contributed to the dramatic record of failed appeals from the registration 
decisions of the Minister of National Revenue. 
I have argued that the Federal Court of Appeal has the authority to 
exercise the curative powers of the Court of Chancery in determining 
charitable registration appeals under subsection 172(3) of the ITA and 
that there are compelling reasons for it to do so in an appropriate case. The 
most likely objections to the Federal Court of Appeal acting as a court of 
equity — that the appellants are corporations, that the Court’s decisions 
have tax consequences and that the registered charity regime precludes 
such exercise — are far less potent than a first glance would admit. There 
remain reasons to be cautious about the exercise of equitable powers 
within the registered charity regime — especially where tax consequences 
are in issue, the public has an interest in the construction of purportedly 
charitable objects not being “strained”. However, Parliament has signaled 
139. Equity, it is often said, “was introduced to mitigate the rigour of the 
law”: see Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2), [1974] Ch 269 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) 
at 322, cited in The Hon BM McLachlin, “The Place of Equity and 
Equitable Doctrines in the Contemporary Common Law World: A 
Canadian Perspective,” in DWM Waters, ed, Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1993) at 39.
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through the ITA that the Federal Court of Appeal has a continuing role 
to play in developing and rationalizing the law of charity in Canada. If 
the Court refuses to allow a role for equity in mitigating the rigour of its 
decisions, that role may effectively disappear. 
